Merger, partial collusion and relocation

Pedro Posada and Odd Rune Straume
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Pedro Posada: University of Warwick

No 167, Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 from Royal Economic Society

Abstract: We set up a three-firm model of spatial competition to analyse how a merger affects the incentives for relocation, and conversely, how the possibility of relocation affects the profitability of the merger, particularly for the non-participating firm. The analysis is carried out for the assumptions of both mill pricing and price discrimination, and we also consider the case of partial collusion. For the case of mill pricing, a merger will generally induce the merger participants to relocate, but the direction of relocation is ambiguous, and dependent on the degree of convexity in the consumers' transportation cost function. We also identify a set of parameter values for which the free-rider effect of a merger vanishes, implying that the possibility of relocation could solve the `merger paradox', even in the absence of price discrimination.

Keywords: spatial competition; merger; relocation; partial collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L41 R30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-06-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-geo and nep-ind
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Merger, Partial Collusion and Relocation (2004)
Working Paper: Merger, partial collusion and relocation (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecj:ac2003:167

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