US Monetary Policy Rules: the Case for Asymmetric Preferences
Paolo Surico ()
No 199, Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 from Royal Economic Society
This paper investigates the empirical relevance of a new framework for monetary policy analysis in which decision makers are allowed to weight differently positive and negative deviations of inflation and output from the target values. The specification of the central bank objective is general enough to nest the symmetric quadratic form as a special case, thereby making the derived policy rule potentially nonlinear. This forms the basis of our identification strategy which is used to evelop a formal hypothesis testing for the presence of asymmetric preferences. Reduced-form estimates of postwar US policy rules indicate that the preferences of the Fed have been highly asymmetric with respect to both inflation and output gaps, with the latter being the dominant source of nonlinearity after 1983.
Keywords: nonlinear optimal monetary policy rules; asymmetric loss function; linearized central bank Euler equation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C52 E52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecj:ac2003:199
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