Decision making in the ECB's Governing Council - Should minutes and forecasts be published?

Gisela Waisman
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Gisela Waisman: Stockholm University

No 214, Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 from Royal Economic Society

Abstract: Governments seem to influence the decisions taken by the Governing Council of the ECB. It's been argued that the publication of forecasts and minutes of the Governing Council's meetings would have a negative effect due to the influence of governments on their representatives' votes. In my model, such information reduces their influence and benefits the Executive Board. Governments benefit from the publication of minutes, while they sometimes disagree with respect to the forecasts. The model suggests that the EMU members may want to withhold the publication of forecasts when taking enlargement with a more heterogeneous group of countries into account.

Keywords: European central bank; EMU; monetary union; voting; transparency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E42 E58 F33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-06-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec, nep-ifn and nep-mon
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