Moral Hazard in a model of Bank Run with Noisy Signals

Juntip Boonprakaikawe and S. Ghosal
Additional contact information
Juntip Boonprakaikawe: University of Warwick
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Sayantan Ghosal and Sourendra Nath Ghosal

No 27, Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 from Royal Economic Society

Abstract: We show that multiple equilibria exist in a model of bank run with moral hazard. Furthermore, this is true even with noisy signals on the economic fundamentals. We argue that the conditions under which this happens can arise naturally in models of banking with moral hazard problem.

Keywords: banking; fundamentals; signals; equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D80 D82 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-06-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://repec.org/res2003/Boonprakaikawe.pdf full text

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecj:ac2003:27

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 from Royal Economic Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().