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Why did British electricity prices fall after 1998?

Richard Green () and Joanne Evans

No 92, Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 from Royal Economic Society

Abstract: In an attempt to reduce high electricity prices in England and Wales the government has reduced concentration among generators and introduced New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA). Econometric analysis on monthly data from April 1996 to September 2002 implies support for two conflicting hypotheses. On a static view, increases in competition and the capacity margin were chiefly responsible for the fall in prices. If generators had been tacitly colluding before NETA, however, the impending change in market rules might have changed their behaviour a few months before the abolition of the Pool. That view implies that NETA reduced prices.

Keywords: electricity; market power; concentration; market rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L94 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-06-04
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Related works:
Working Paper: Why Did British Electricity Prices Fall after 1998? (2005) Downloads
Working Paper: Why did British Electricity Prices Fall after 1998? (2003) Downloads
Working Paper: Why did British electricity prices fall after 1998? (2003) Downloads
Working Paper: Why did British electricity prices fall after 1998? (2003) Downloads
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