Joint Production Games with Mixed Sharing Rules

Roger Hartley and Richard Cornes

No 99, Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 from Royal Economic Society

Abstract: We study joint production games under a mixed sharing rule in which part of the ouput (the mixing parameter) is shared in proportion to inputs and the rest according to exogenously determined shares. We show that this game has a unique Nash equilibrium and discuss comparative statics. When the game is large, we show that players unanimously prefer the same value of the mixing parameter: the equilibrium elasticity of production. At this value, the equilibrium allocation is fully efficient. Our approach heavily exploits the fact that payoffs depend only on a player's input and the aggregate input.

Keywords: production externalities; non-cooperative games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 H42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-06-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-pbe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Joint Production Games with Mixed Sharing Rules (2002)
Working Paper: Joint Production Games with Mixed Sharing Rules (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecj:ac2003:99

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