Bank Failure: Evidence from the Colombia Financial Crisis

Jose Gomez-Gonzalez and Nicholas Kiefer ()

Working Papers from Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics

Abstract: This paper identifies the main bank specific determinants of bank failure during the financial crisis in Colombia using duration analysis. Using partial likelihood estimation, it shows that the process of failure of financial institutions during that period can be explained by differences in financial health and prudence across institutions. The capitalization ratio is the most significant indicator explaining bank failure. Increases in this ratio lead to a reduction in the hazard rate of failure at any given moment in time. Of special relevance, this ratio exhibits a non-linear component. Our results thus provide empirical support for existing regulatory practice. Other important variables explaining bank failure dynamics are bank's size and profitability.

JEL-codes: C41 E40 E58 G21 G23 G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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https://cae.economics.cornell.edu/06-12.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: BANK FAILURE: EVIDENCE FROM THE COLOMBIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:corcae:06-12

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