Investor Protection and Corporate Governance

Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes (), Andrei Schleifer and Robert Vishny
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Andrei Shleifer

Working Paper Series from Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government

Abstract: Recent research has documented large differences among countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded firms, in the breadth and depth of capital markets, in dividend policies, and in the access of firms to external finance. A common element to the explanations of these differences is how well investors, both shareholders and creditors, are protected by law from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders of firms. We describe the differences in laws and the effectiveness of their enforcement across countries, discuss the possible origins of these differences, summarize their consequences, and assess potential strategies of corporate governance reform. We argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank-centered and market-centered financial systems.

Date: 2001-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Investor protection and corporate governance (2000)
Working Paper: Investor protection and corporate governance (2000)
Working Paper: Investor Protection and Corporate Governance
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