Increasing Participation and Compliance in International Climate Change Agreements

Scott Barrett and Robert Stavins
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Scott Barrett: Harvard U

Working Paper Series from Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government

Abstract: Scientific and economic consensus increasingly points to the need for a credible and cost-effective approach to address the threat of global climate change, but the Kyoto Protocol to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change appears incapable of inducing significant participation and compliance. We assess the Protocol and thirteen alternative policy architectures that have been proposed, with particular attention to their respective abilities to induce participation and compliance. We find that those approaches that offer cost-effective mitigation are unlikely to induce significant participation and compliance, while the approaches that are likely to enjoy a reasonably high level of implementation by sovereign states are sorely lacking in terms of their anticipated cost effectiveness. The feasible set of policy architectures is thus limited to second-best alternatives. Much more attention needs to be given -- both by scholarly research and by international negotiations -- to aspects of future international climate agreements that will affect the degrees of participation and compliance that can reasonably be expected to be forthcoming.

Date: 2002-08
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Journal Article: Increasing Participation and Compliance in International Climate Change Agreements (2003)
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