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When Does Gender Matter in Negotiation?

Hannah Riley Bowles and Kathleen L. McGinn
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Hannah Riley Bowles: Harvard U
Kathleen L. McGinn: Harvard U

Working Paper Series from Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government

Abstract: We propose that two situational dimensions moderate gender effects in negotiation. Structural ambiguity refers to potential variation in a party’s perception of the bargaining range and appropriate standards for agreement. Gender triggers are situational factors that make gender salient and relevant to behavior or expectations. Based on a review of field and experimental data and social psychological theory on individual difference, we explain how structural ambiguity and gender triggers make negotiations ripe for gender effects.

Date: 2002-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp02-036

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