Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of Global Climate Policy Architectures

Joseph Aldy, Scott Barrett and Robert Stavins
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Scott Barrett: Johns Hopkins U

Working Paper Series from Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government

Abstract: We critically review the Kyoto Protocol and thirteen alternative policy architectures for addressing the threat of global climate change. We employ six criteria to evaluate the policy proposals: environmental outcome, dynamic efficiency, cost effectiveness, equity, flexibility in the presence of new information, and incentives for participation and compliance. The Kyoto Protocol does not fare well on a number of criteria, but none of the alternative proposals fare well along all six dimensions. We identify several major themes among the alternative proposals: Kyoto is "too little, too fast"; developing countries should play a more substantial role and receive incentives to participate; implementation should focus on market-based approaches, especially those with price mechanisms; and participation and compliance incentives are inadequately addressed by most proposals. Our investigation reveals tensions among several of the evaluative criteria, such as between environmental outcome and efficiency, and between cost-effectiveness and incentives for participation and compliance.

Date: 2003-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (133)

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http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/rstavins/Papers/Thirteen_Plus_One_Article.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Thirteen plus one: a comparison of global climate policy architectures (2003)
Working Paper: Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of Global Climate Policy Architectures (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp03-012

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