Mechanism Design with Multidimensional, Continuous Types and Interdependent Valuations

Nolan Miller, John H. Pratt, Richard Zeckhauser and Scott Johnson
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Nolan Miller: Harvard U
John H. Pratt: Harvard U
Scott Johnson: Australian National U

Working Paper Series from Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government

Abstract: We consider the mechanism design problem when agents' types are multidimensional and continuous, and their valuations are interdependent. If there are at least three agents whose types satisfy a weak correlation condition, then for any decision rule there exist balanced transfers that render truthful revelation a Bayesian ?-equilibrium. A slightly stronger correlation condition ensures balanced transfers exist that induce a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which agents' strategies are nearly truthful. This paper extends the analysis of KSG RWP03-020.

JEL-codes: C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-07
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https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/work ... ?PubId=4038&type=WPN

Related works:
Journal Article: Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp06-028

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