A New Compensation Mechanism for Preference Erosion in the Doha Round

Robert Lawrence and Tatiana Rosito
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Tatiana Rosito: Embassy of Brazil, Singapore

Working Paper Series from Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government

Abstract: The Doha Round is intended to advance the interests of developing countries but it has run into problems because additional liberalization in sectors of interest to some developing countries could erode the preferences of others. None of the current proposals to deal with the issue, either through delaying liberalization or providing compensation have found widespread support. In this paper we explore a proposal to backload the phase-in of MFN tariff reductions in sensitive sectors and use the revenues generated to provide compensation for preference erosion. We argue that the approach would be both equitable and effective. [Jointly published with Center for International Development Blue Sky Conference and KSG Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP06-044.]

Date: 2006-10
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https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/work ... ?PubId=4219&type=WPN

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Working Paper: A New Compensation Mechanism for Preference Erosion in the Doha Round (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp06-044

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