Gender in Job Negotiations: A Two-Level Game

Hannah Riley Bowles and Kathleen McGinn
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Hannah Riley Bowles: Harvard U
Kathleen McGinn: ?

Working Paper Series from Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government

Abstract: We propose a two-level-game (Putnam, 1988) perspective on gender in job negotiations. At Level 1, candidates negotiate with the employers. At Level 2, candidates negotiate with domestic partners. In order to illuminate the interplay between these two levels, we review literature from two separate bodies of literature. Research in psychology and organizational behavior on candidate-employer negotiations sheds light on the effects of gender on Level 1 negotiations. Research from economics and sociology on intra-household bargaining elucidates how negotiations over the allocation of domestic labor at Level 2 influence labor force participation at Level 1. In conclusion, we integrate practical implications from these two bodies of literature to propose a set of prescriptive suggestions for candidates to approach job negotiations as a two-level game and to minimize disadvantageous effects of gender on job negotiation outcomes.

Date: 2008-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-lab
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp08-027

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