On the Philosophy of Group Decision Methods I: The Non-obviousness of Majority Rule

Mathias Risse
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Mathias Risse: Harvard U

Working Paper Series from Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government

Abstract: Majority rule is often adopted almost by default as a group decision rule. One might think, therefore, that the conditions under which it applies, and the argument on its behalf, are well-understood. However, the standard arguments in support of majority rule display systematic deficiencies. This article explores these weaknesses, and assesses what can be said on behalf of majority rule.

Date: 2008-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp08-064

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