Cultural Explanations of Electoral Reform: A Policy Cycle Model

Pippa Norris
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Pippa Norris: Harvard University

Working Paper Series from Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government

Abstract: The standard explanation of electoral reform is offered by rational choice accounts. These regard the choice of rules as an elite?level issue, dominated by partisan interests bargaining within the legislature, where citizens are usually marginalized and powerless. Such accounts may help to explain what specific reforms are enacted but they lack the capacity to account satisfactorily for the logically prior questions: when and why are any successful reforms raised on the policy agenda?

Date: 2010-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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