Endowments, Exclusion, and Exchange

Ivan Balbuzanov and Maciej Kotowski

Working Paper Series from Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government

Abstract: We propose a new cooperative solution for discrete exchange economies and resource allocation problems, the exclusion core. The exclusion core is neither weaker nor stronger than the (strong) core and it rests upon a foundational idea in the legal understanding of property, the right to exclude others. By reinterpreting endowments as a distribution of exclusion rights, we can extend our analysis to economies with qualified property rights and social hierarchies. The exclusion core characterizes a generalized top trading cycle algorithm in a large class of economies, including those featuring private and public ownership.

JEL-codes: C71 D47 K11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Endowments, Exclusion, and Exchange (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp17-016

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