Market Frictions, Governance and Economic Rents: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead

Joseph T. Mahoney and Lihong Qian
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Joseph T. Mahoney: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Lihong Qian: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Working Papers from University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business

Abstract: This paper develops a more unified organizational economics theory within Strategy. We begin with perfectly competitive markets derived from the first fundamental welfare theorem of economics, and develop a parsimonious typology of market frictions. We show how two primary questions in Strategy--why firms exist and why some firms outperform others--can be evaluated from this market frictions logic. Building on this logic enables more systematic explanations and predictions concerning governance structures and economic rents in Strategy research.

Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:illbus:09-0104

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