Who Is in Charge? A Property Rights Perspective on Stakeholder Governance

Peter Klein, Joseph T. Mahoney, Anita M. McGahan and Christos Pitelis
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Joseph T. Mahoney: University of IL
Anita M. McGahan: University of Toronto and Institute for Strategy and Competitiveness, Harvard University

Working Papers from University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business

Abstract: Debates on "shareholder" and "stakeholder" approaches to corporate governance often get bogged down in competing normative claims about economic rent streams, entitlements of different group members, fairness, and similar distributional issues. These concerns are important, but core economic issues in shareholder-stakeholder debates revolve around the positive analysis of property rights, transaction costs, ownership, and control. Going beyond the stylized assumptions of neoclassical economics, which assume away co-investment by the firm's transactional and contractual partners, we show how theories of implicit and explicit contracting help us understand better joint investments and the creation of joint value. We call on scholars of Strategic Organization to embrace more robust theories of the firm and interfirm relations that take seriously the complex web of investments and residual claims that characterize team production and co-created value.

Date: 2012-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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