The Performance of Hedge Fund Performance Fees

Itzhak Ben-David, Justin Birru and Andrea Rossi
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Justin Birru: Ohio State U
Andrea Rossi: U of Arizona

Working Paper Series from Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics

Abstract: We study the long-run outcomes associated with hedge funds' compensation structure. Over a 22-year period, the aggregate effective incentive fee rate is 2.5 times the average contractual rate (i.e., around 50% instead of 20%). Overall, investors collected 36 cents for every dollar earned on their invested capital (over a risk-free hurdle rate and before adjusting for any risk). In the cross-section of funds, there is a substantial disconnect between lifetime performance and incentive fees earned. These poor outcomes stem from the asymmetry of the performance contract, investors' return-chasing behavior, and underwater fund closures.

JEL-codes: G11 G23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Working Paper: The Performance of Hedge Fund Performance Fees (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:ohidic:2020-14

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