Time Consistency of Fiscal and Monetary Policy: A Solution

Mats Persson, Torsten Persson () and Lars E. O. Svenssor
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Lars E. O. Svenssor: Princeton U

Papers from Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy

Abstract: This paper demonstrates how time consistency of the Ramsey policy -- the optimal fiscal and monetary policy under commitment -- can be achieved. Each government should leave its successor with a unique maturity structure for the nominal and indexed debt, such that the marginal benefit of a surprise inflation exactly balances the marginal cost. Unlike in earlier papers on the topic, the result holds for quite a general Ramsey policy, including timevarying polices with positive inflation and positive nominal interest rates. We compare our results with those in Persson, Persson, and Svensson (1987), Calvo and Obstfeld (1990), and Alvarez, Kehoe, and Neumeyer (2004).

JEL-codes: E31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/department/Semina ... -svensson-101904.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Time Consistency of Fiscal and Monetary Policy: A Solution (2006)
Working Paper: Time Consistency of Fiscal and Monetary Policy: A Solution (2005)
Working Paper: Time Consistency of Fiscal and Monetary Policy: A Solution (2005)
Working Paper: Time Consistency of Fiscal and Monetary Policy: A Solution (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:prirpe:09-03-2005

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