Efficiency, Equity, and Timing in Voting Mechanisms

Marco Battaglini, Rebecca Morton and Thomas Palfrey

Papers from Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy

Abstract: We compare the behavior of voters, depending on whether they operate under sequential and simultaneous voting rules, when voting is costly and information is incomplete. In many real political institutions, ranging from small committees to mass elections, voting is sequential, which allows some voters to know the choices of earlier voters. For a stylized model, we characterize the equilibria for this rule, and compare it to simultaneous voting, and show how these equilibria vary for different voting costs. This generates a variety of predictions about the relative efficiency and equity of these two systems, which we test using controlled laboratory experiments. Most of the qualitative predictions are supported by the data, but there are significant departures from the predicted equilibrium strategies, in both the sequential and simultanous voting games. We find a tradeoff between information aggregation, efficiency, and equity in sequential voting: a sequential voting rule aggregates information better, and produces more efficient outcomes on average, compared to simultaneous voting, but sequential voting leads to significant inequities, with later voters benfitting at the expense of early voters.

Date: 2005-09
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Related works:
Journal Article: Efficiency, Equity, and Timing of Voting Mechanisms (2007)
Working Paper: Efficiency, Equity, and Timing in Voting Mechanisms (2006)
Working Paper: Efficiency, equity, and timing of voting mechanisms (2006)
Working Paper: Efficiency, Equity and Timing in Voting Mechanisms (2005)
Working Paper: Efficiency, Equity, and Timing in Voting Mechanisms (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:prirpe:09-19-2005c

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