Local Public Good Provision: Voting, Peer Effects, and Mobility
Stephen Calabrese (),
Thomas Romer and
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Thomas Romer: Princeton U
Holger Sieg: Carnegie Mellon U
Papers from Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy
Few empirical strategies have been developed that investigate public provision under majority rule while taking explicit account of the constraints implied by mobility of households. The goal of this paper is to improve our understanding of voting in local communities when neighborhood quality depends on peer or neighborhood effects. We develop a new empirical approach which allows us to impose all restrictions that arise from locational equilibrium models with myopic voting simultaneously on the data generating process. We can then analyze how close myopic models come in replicating the main regularities about expenditures, taxes, sorting by income and housing observed in the data. We find that a myopic voting model that incorporates peer effects fits all dimensions of the data reasonably well.
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Journal Article: Local public good provision: Voting, peer effects, and mobility (2006)
Working Paper: Local Public Good Provision: Voting, Peer Effects, and Mobility (2005)
Working Paper: Local Public Good Provision: Voting, Peer Effects, and Mobility
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:prirpe:10-04-2005
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