The War of Information
Faruk Gul and
Wolfgang Pesendorfer ()
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Faruk Gul: Princeton University
Papers from Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy
We analyze political campaigns between two parties with opposing interests. Parties pay a cost to provide information to a voter who chooses the policy. The information flow is continuous and stops when parties quit. The parties' actions are strategic substitutes: a party with a lower cost provides more but its opponent provides less information. For voters, the parties' actions are complements and raising the low-cost party's cost may be beneficial. Asymmetric information adds a signaling component in the form of a belief-threshold beyond which unfavorable information is offset by the informed party's decision to continue campaigning.
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Journal Article: The War of Information (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:prirpe:9-13-2010
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