Mediocracy

Andrea Mattozzi and Antonio Merlo

Working Papers from Rice University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study the recruitment of individuals in the political sector. We propose an equilibrium model of political recruitment by two political parties competing in an election. We show that political parties may deliberately choose to recruit only mediocre politicians, in spite of the fact that they could select better individuals. Furthermore, we show that this phenomenon is more likely to occur in proportional than in majoritarian electoral systems.

JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-pol
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Related works:
Journal Article: Mediocracy (2015)
Working Paper: Mediocracy (2015)
Working Paper: Mediocracy (2007)
Working Paper: Mediocracy (2007)
Working Paper: Mediocracy (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:riceco:14-002

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