Aligning Learning Incentives of Students and Teachers: Results from a Social Experiment in Mexican High Schools
Susan Parker (),
Petra E. Todd and
Kenneth I. Wolpin
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Petra E. Todd: University of PA
Kenneth I. Wolpin: Rice University and University of PA
Working Papers from Rice University, Department of Economics
This paper evaluates the impact of three different performance incentive schemes using data from a social experiment that randomized 88 Mexican high schools with over 40,000 students into three treatment groups and a control group. Treatment one provides individual incentives for performance on curriculum-based mathematics tests to students only, treatment two to teachers only and treatment three gives both individual and group incentives to students, teachers and school administrators. Program impact estimates reveal the largest average effects for treatment three, smaller impacts for treatment one and no impact for treatment two.
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Journal Article: Aligning Learning Incentives of Students and Teachers: Results from a Social Experiment in Mexican High Schools (2015)
Working Paper: Aligning Learning Incentives of Students and Teachers: Results from a Social Experiment in Mexican High Schools (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:riceco:14-019
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