EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Commons with Increasing Marginal Costs: Random Priority versus Average Cost

Herve Moulin and Hervé Crès

Working Papers from Rice University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Indivisible units are produced with increasing marginal costs. Under average cost, each user pays average cost. Under random priority, users are randomly ordered (without bias) and successively offered to buy at the true marginal cost. Both average cost (AC) and random priority (RP) inefficiently overproduce. RP tends to overproduce less, but which game collects more surplus depends much on the demand configuration. We show that a key to compare the welfare properties of the two mechanisms is the crowding factor, i.e., the number of potential users over the number of units of output users can afford: The more crowded the commons, the more RP outperforms AC. In the quadratic cost case, beyond the threshold value of 2.4 for the crowding factor, RP strongly outperforms AC; beneath it AC only mildly outperforms RP. Thus the RP mechanism manages crowded commons better than AC.

JEL-codes: D60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~econ/papers/2000papers/04Moulin.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Commons with increasing marginal costs: random priority versus average cost (2003)
Working Paper: Commons with increasing marginal costs: random priority versus average cost (2003)
Working Paper: Commons with increasing marginal costs: random priority versus average cost (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:riceco:2000-04

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Rice University, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-30
Handle: RePEc:ecl:riceco:2000-04