Schmooze or Lose: Social Friction and Lubrication in E-Mail Negotiations

Michael Morris, Janice Nadler, Terri Kurtzberg and Leigh Thompson
Additional contact information
Michael Morris: Stanford U
Janice Nadler: Northwestern U
Terri Kurtzberg: ?
Leigh Thompson: ?

Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business

Abstract: We explored how the process of e-mail negotiation differs from face-to-face negotiation and then tested hypotheses about how its liabilities can be minimized. In the first experiment, participants negotiated one-on-one, either face-to-face or via e-mail. Consistent with expectations, negotiators took advantage of e-mail by exchanging more complex, multiple-issue offers than they exchanged face-to-face. Yet, e-mail reduced rapport-building conversation about non-negotiable, contextual issues, and clarifying questions which prevent misunderstandings and facilitate rapport. E-mail negotiators compensated with more explicit statements about the relationship, but these were less effective in preventing mistrust and misunderstanding. In a second experiment, we tested the power of a minimal intervention designed to reduce the liabilities of e-mail. Half the negotiation dyads had a personalized telephone conversation ("schmoozed") before engaging in e-mail negotiations, and the other half did not schmooze. Even though the telephone conversation was strictly non-business, schmoozing negotiators anticipated and planned a cooperative, positive negotiation experience from the outset, and they attained better economic and social outcomes. This was primarily true among mixed-gender dyads.

Date: 2000-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/library/rp1639.pdf
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Can't connect to gsbapps.stanford.edu:443 (certificate verify failed) (http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/library/rp1639.pdf [302 Found]--> https://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/library/rp1639.pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:stabus:1639

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().