The Foundations of Imperfect Decision Making

Chris Tyson
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Chris Tyson: Stanford U

Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business

Abstract: A theory of decision-making is proposed that speaks to Herbert Simon's methodological critique of economics without resorting to excessive reductionism. Formally, the new theory removes the Contraction axiom of conventional choice theory (which is itself reviewed in detail). In its interpretation, the theory reflects a conceit that decision makers may not fully perceive their preferences among alternatives, with perceived preference being assumed to possess different sets of properties. A utility-based representation of the postulated behavior is obtained, and is seen to be reminiscent of Simon's notion of "satisficing."

Date: 2001-11
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Related works:
Journal Article: Cognitive constraints, contraction consistency, and the satisficing criterion (2008)
Working Paper: Axiomatic Foundations for Satisficing Behavior (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:stabus:1714

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