Games with Incomplete Awareness

Yossi Feinberg
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Yossi Feinberg: Stanford U

Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business

Abstract: A new game form termed games with incomplete awareness is defined. This game form captures unawareness as to other players' actions, as well as unawareness of the existence of some players. It also captures interactive unawareness: the awareness of players as to what other players are aware of, and so on. An extended Nash equilibrium solution is defined and studied in these games.

JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:stabus:1894

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