Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets

Michael Ostrovsky and Michael Schwarz
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Michael Schwarz: Yahoo! Research

Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business

Abstract: This paper explores information disclosure in matching markets, e.g., the informativeness of transcripts given out by universities. We show that the same, "benchmark," amount of information is disclosed in essentially all equilibria. We then demonstrate that if universities disclose the benchmark amount of information, students and employers will not find it profitable to contract early; if they disclose more, unraveling will occur.

Date: 2007-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/library/RP1965.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets (2010)
Working Paper: Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:stabus:1965

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