Computing Equilibria of N-Player Games with Arbitrary Accuracy

Srihari Govindand and Robert Wilson ()
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Srihari Govindand: U of Iowa

Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business

Abstract: From a variant of Kuhn's triangulation we derive a discrete version of the Global Newton Method that yields an epsilon-equilibrium of an N-player game and then sequentially reduces epsilon toward zero to obtain any desired precision or the best precision for any number of iterations.

Date: 2008-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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