Existence of Equilibria in Auctions with Private Values

Srihari Govindan and Robert Wilson ()

Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business

Abstract: A first-price sealed-bid auction of an item for which bidders are risk-neutral and have privately known values is shown to have an equilibrium in mixed behavioral strategies if the joint distribution of bidders' values has a continuous density on a cubical support. Such an equilibrium has atomless distributions of bids and is not affected by the rule for resolving tied bids.

Date: 2010-02
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