It Takes a Village to Maintain a Dangerous Financial System

Anat Admati

Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business

Abstract: I discuss the motivations and actions (or inaction) of individuals in the financial system, governments, central banks, academia and the media that collectively contribute to the persistence of a dangerous and distorted financial system and inadequate, poorly designed regulations. Reassurances that regulators are doing their best to protect the public are false. The underlying problem is a powerful mix of distorted incentives, ignorance, confusion, and lack of accountability. Willful blindness seems to play a role in flawed claims by the system's enablers that obscure reality and muddle the policy debate.

Date: 2016-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pke and nep-rmg
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/gsb-cmis/gsb-cmis-download-auth/417406
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/gsb-cmis/gsb-cmis-download-auth/417406 [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/gsb-cmis/gsb-cmis-download-auth/417406)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:stabus:3426

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().