The Leverage Ratchet Effect

Anat Admati, Peter DeMarzo, Martin Hellwig and Paul Pfleiderer
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Paul Pfleiderer: Stanford University

Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business

Abstract: This paper explores the dynamics of corporate leverage when funding decisions are made in the interests of shareholders. In the absence of prior commitments or regulations, shareholder-creditor conflicts give rise to a leverage ratchet effect, which induces shareholders to resist reductions while favoring increases in leverage even when total-value maximization calls for the opposite. Unlike inefficiencies based on asymmetric information, the leverage ratchet effect applies to all forms of leverage reduction, including earnings retentions and rights offerings. The leverage ratchet effect is present even in the absence of frictions other than the inability to write complete contracts. The effect creates an agency cost of debt that lowers the value of the leveraged firm. Standard frictions magnify the impact of the effect. In a dynamic context, since leverage becomes effectively irreversible, firms may limit leverage initially but then ratchet it up in response to shocks. The resulting leverage dynamics can produce outcomes that cannot be explained by simple tradeoff considerations.

Date: 2015-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: The Leverage Ratchet Effect (2018)
Working Paper: The Leverage Ratchet Effect (2017)
Working Paper: The Leverage Ratchet Effect (2017)
Working Paper: The Leverage Ratchet Effect (2013)
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