A Skeptical View of Financialized Corporate Governance

Anat Admati

Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business

Abstract: Financialized corporate governance as commonly practiced causes significant inefficiencies and harm. Corporations and governments routinely fail to design and enforce rules that reduce the opacity of corporations, create effective commitments that prevent harm, and ensure proper accountability. The financial sector provides extreme illustrations of these governance failures, which persist despite repeated scandals and crises. Misleading narratives that obscure reality enable individuals in the private and public sectors, even in well-developed democracies, to abuse power with impunity.

Date: 2017-06
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Journal Article: A Skeptical View of Financialized Corporate Governance (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:stabus:3551

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