The Subsidy to Infrastructure as an Asset Class
Aleksandar Andonov,
Roman Kräussl and
Joshua D. Rauh
Additional contact information
Aleksandar Andonov: University of Amsterdam
Joshua D. Rauh: Stanford University, Hoover Institution, and NBER
Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business
Abstract:
We investigate the characteristics of infrastructure as an asset class from an investment perspective of a limited partner. While non U.S. institutional investors gain exposure to infrastructure assets through a mix of direct investments and private fund vehicles, U.S. investors predominantly invest in infrastructure through private funds. We find that the stream of cash flows delivered by private infrastructure funds to institutional investors is very similar to that delivered by other types of private equity, as reflected by the frequency and amounts of net cash flows. U.S. public pension funds perform worse than other institutional investors in their infrastructure fund investments, although they are exposed to underlying deals with very similar project stage, concession terms, ownership structure, industry, and geographical location. By selecting funds that invest in projects with poor financial performance, U.S. public pension funds have created an implicit subsidy to infrastructure as an asset class, which we estimate within the range of $730 million to $3.16 billion per year depending on the benchmark.
JEL-codes: G11 G23 G28 H54 H75 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-09
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/gsb-cmis/gsb-cmis-download-auth/470481
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found
Related works:
Working Paper: The Subsidy to Infrastructure as an Asset Class (2018) 
Working Paper: The subsidy to infrastructure as an asset class (2018) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:stabus:3737
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().