The Allocation of Decision Authority to Human and Artificial Intelligence

Susan Athey, Kevin Bryan () and Joshua Gans

Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business

Abstract: The allocation of decision authority by a principal to either a human agent or an artificial intelligence (AI) is examined. The principal trades off an AI's more aligned choice with the need to motivate the human agent to expend effort in learning choice payoffs. When agent effort is desired, it is shown that the principal is more likely to give that agent decision authority, reduce investment in AI reliability and adopt an AI that may be biased. Organizational design considerations are likely to impact on how AIs are trained.

Date: 2020-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-big, nep-cmp and nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: The Allocation of Decision Authority to Human and Artificial Intelligence (2020)
Working Paper: The Allocation of Decision Authority to Human and Artificial Intelligence (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:stabus:3856

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