The Good, the Bad and the Complex: Product Design with Impeperfect Information

Vladimir Asriyan, Dana Foarta and Victoria Vanasco
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Victoria Vanasco: CREi and Barcelona GSE

Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business

Abstract: We study the joint determination of product quality and complexity in a rational setting. We introduce a novel notion of complexity, which affects how costly it is for an agent to acquire information about product quality. In our model, an agent can accept or reject a product proposed by a designer, who can affect the quality and the complexity of the product. Examples include banks that design financial products that they offer to retail investors, or policymakers who propose policies for approval by voters. We find that complexity is not necessarily a feature of low quality products. While an increase in alignment between the agent and the designer leads to more complex but better quality products, higher product demand or lower competition among designers leads to more complex and lower quality products. Our findings produce novel empirical implications on the relationship between quality and complexity, which we relate to evidence within the context of financial products and regulatory policies.

JEL-codes: D78 D82 D83 G18 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Good, the Bad, and the Complex: Product Design with Imperfect Information (2023)
Working Paper: The Good, the Bad and the Complex: Product Design with Imperfect Information (2021)
Working Paper: The good, the bad and the complex: Product design with imperfect information (2021)
Working Paper: The good, the bad, and the complex: product design with asymmetric information (2020)
Working Paper: The Good, The Bad and The Complex: Product Design with Imperfect Information (2019)
Working Paper: Strategic Complexity When Seeking Approval (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:stabus:3885

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