Internal Governance Mechanisms and Pension Fund Performance

Krzysztof Jackowicz and Oskar Kowalewski ()
Additional contact information
Krzysztof Jackowicz: Kozminski University

Working Papers from University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Weiss Center

Abstract: This study provides new empirical evidence on the impact of board structure, as an internal governance mechanism, on privately defined contribution pension fund performance. Using a hand-collected dataset, we find evidence that the chairman, as a motivated insider, plays an important role in determining fund performance. The results also suggest, although with weaker evidence, that outsiders may positively impact fund performance. One explanation for this result is the weaker motivation of the outsiders to monitor fund performance. Consequently, the results show that both the composition of the board and the motivation of the board members are important in explaining pension fund performance, while other governance factors have no impact on its performance. The results provide relevant insights into the current regulatory debate on the reforms of the pension fund industry, arguing that modifying the board structure and its members' motivations may improve its governance and, hence, its performance. Consequently, the overall policy conclusion of this study is that more focus should be put on the board structure of pension funds, taking into account the different interests of the beneficiaries and fund shareholders.

JEL-codes: G23 G28 G30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-07
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/11/11-46.pdf
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/11/11-46.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://wifpr.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/11/11-46.pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:upafin:11-46

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Weiss Center Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().