Conflict Leads to Cooperation in Nash Bargaining

Kareen Rozen ()

Working Papers from Yale University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider a Nash demand game where N players come to the bargaining table with requests for coalition partners and a potentially generated resource. We show that group learning leads to complete cooperation and an interior core allocation with probability one. Our arguments highlight group dynamics and demonstrate how destructive group behaviors--exclusion, divide and conquer tactics, and scapegoating--can propel groups toward beneficial and self-enforcing cooperation.

JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-soc
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Related works:
Working Paper: Conflict Leads to Cooperation in Nash Bargaining (2009)
Working Paper: Conflict Leads to Cooperation in Nash Bargaining (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:yaleco:39

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