Non-Duty Effects and a Strategic Use of Antidumping Petition

Honggue Lee

No 492, Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings from Econometric Society

Abstract: Abstract This paper considers a signaling game in which the non-duty effects of antidumping petition influence filing motivations behind the domestic firm’s filing strategies. In this game, “abusive†antidumping occurs when the domestic firm files petitions strategically so as to take advantage of private information regarding its filing motivations, which can be made possible when a pooling or a semi-separating equilibrium is obtained. A strategic use of antidumping takes place when the outcome filer happens to be a high-cost type instead of a low-cost type. In this case, no separating equilibrium exists, in which the outcome filer files and the process filer withdraws. The outcome filer may make so much efforts that its payoff net of petitioning expenses could be less than that it can obtain by withdrawing. Or the process filer may spend so little that its payoff for not filing could not be greater than that for filing. The possibility of abusive antidumping, a pooling or a semi-separating equilibrium, depends on the probability that the domestic firm is an outcome (or a process) filer, the expected loss that the foreign exporter might suffer due to antidumping, the initial profits that the foreign exporter earns in the home market, the cost competitiveness of the domestic firm, the initial sales to the home market, and the effects of a VER on the foreign exporter’s reaction function. The existence of a pooling equilibrium shows why there are so many antidumping petitions, many of which come from outdated, less competitive industries.

Keywords: Antidumping petition; Non-duty effects; Filing motivations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-08-11
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://repec.org/esFEAM04/up.9074.1077282346.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:feam04:492

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings from Econometric Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().