Evolutionarily Stable Correlation

Kam-Chau Wong and Chongmin Kim

No 495, Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings from Econometric Society

Abstract: Most existing results of evolutionary games restrict only to the Nash equilibrium. This paper introduces the analogue of evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) for correlated equilibria. We introduce a new notion of evolutionarily stable correlation (ESC) and prove that it generalizes ESS. We also study analogues of perfection (cf. Dhillon and Mertens (1994)), properness, and replicator dynamics for the correlation equilibrium and discuss their relationships with ESC

Keywords: Correlated Equilibrium; Evolutionarily Stable Correlation; Evolutionarily Stable State; Random Device (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-08-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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