Coalitional Manipulation on Communication Network
Biung-Ghi Ju ()
No 563, Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings from Econometric Society
In an abstract model of division problems, we study division rules that are not manipulable through a reallocation of individual characteristic vectors within a coalition (e.g. reallocation of claims in bankruptcy problems). A coalition can be formed if members of the coalition are connected on a communication network, or a graph. We offer a characterization of non-manipulable division rules without any assumption on the structure of communication network. As corollaries, we obtain a number of earlier characterization results established with the assumption of complete network (complete graph) in various specialized settings. Moreover, our characterization, as we show, can be quite different from the earlier results depending on the network structure: for example, when the network is a tree, much larger family of rules are shown to be non-manipulable. The abstract model we consider can have various special examples such as bankruptcy problems, surplus sharing problems, cost sharing problems, social choice with transferable utility, etc
Keywords: Division problem; Coalitional manipulation; Non-manipulability; Reallocation-proofness; Non-bossiness; Network (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D30 D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:feam04:563
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