 Bargaining and vetoingHankyoung Sung No 688, Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings from Econometric Society Abstract: This paper studies the bargaining game between the president and the congress when these two players have conflicting claims to a fixed amount of resources. I distinguish between situations of "pure divided government", that is when the congress is united "against" the president, and the situations of "impure divided government", that is when the congress itself is divided (equal power of the two parties). The pure divided government case can be represented as a bilateral bargaining game, whereas the impure case needs to be represented as a three-player game. In both situations we assume the president is a veto player, who can exercise veto power only a finite number of times, consistent with the real US constitutional constraints. I will show the consequences of these modelling choices for the equilibrium payoffs of the various players, and I will suggest interesting consequences for the optimal timing choice by the congress, i.e. for the optimal time to make an offer that needs the approval of the president. In addition, I will estimate my conjectures using the States data as emprical applications Keywords: veto player; restriction of the veto right (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:feam04:688 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings from Econometric Society Contact information at EDIRC. |
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