Level-n Bounded Rationality on a Level Playing Field of Sequential Games

Ernan Haruvy and Dale Stahl

No 126, Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings from Econometric Society

Abstract: We report experimental results using a multi-task for simple two-player, two- stage extensive-form games. It is suggested that by creating the perception of a "level playing field" the participants are relieved of responsibility for others since competition on a level playing field is presumed to be fair a priori. Consistent with this suggestion, we find that the vast majority of behavior is individualistic. Moreover, we find that a straightforward extension of the Level-n theory of bounded rationality fits this data remarkably well. We also extend this theory to allow other-regarding preferences, and find that about 15% of the population behaves as if utilitarian and/or spiteful

Keywords: Bounded rationality; sequential games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C5 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-08-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo and nep-exp
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:nawm04:126

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