The Economics of Clear Advice and Extreme Options

Dezsoe Szalay

No 233, Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings from Econometric Society

Abstract: This paper is about freedom of choice and rigidity of choice rules as incentive devices. We study the optimal design of an agent's freedom of choice when his information is endogenous and costly to acquire. We show that curtailing the agent's authority over decision-making may be optimal even if the agent's and the principal's ex post objectives coincide. The agent is forced to depart from prior optimal choices and to take a clear stance on a matter. Having the agent choose from extreme options is derived as a second best optimal contract when his information acquisition technology is "success enhancing" and use of contingent monetary compensation infeasible

Keywords: Delegation; Endogenous Information; Authority (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-08-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Economics of Clear Advice and Extreme Options (2005)
Working Paper: The Economics of Clear Advice and Extreme Options (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:nawm04:233

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