Divide et Impera. Optimnal Deterrence Mechanisms Against Cartels and Organized Crime

Giancarlo Spagnolo

No 485, Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings from Econometric Society

Abstract: Leniency programs reduce sanctions for law violators that self-report. We focus on their ability to deter cartels and organized crime by increasing incentives to "cheat" on partners. Optimally designed "courageous" leniency programs reward the first party that reports with the fines paid by all other parties, and achieve the first best: complete and costless deterrence. "Moderate" leniency programs that only reduce or cancel sanctions may deter organized crime (a) by protecting an agent that defects from fines and from other agents' punishment; and (b) by increasing the riskiness of crime/collusion, in the sense of Harsanyi and Selten (1988). 038 \pagebreak

Keywords: Antitrust; Cartels; Collusion; Competition policy; Crime deterrence; Law enforcement; Leniency; Organized crime; Risk dominance; Self-reporting. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L13 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-08-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-law and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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