Networks of Relations

Giancarlo Spagnolo and Steffen Lippert

No 496, Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings from Econometric Society

Abstract: In this paper, we model networks of relational contracts. We explore sanctioning power within these networks under different information technologies depending on the shape of the network. The value of the relational network lies in the enforcement of cooperative agreements which would not be enforceable for the agents without access to the punishment power of other network members. We identify conditions for stability of such networks, conditions for transmission of information about past actions, and conditions under which self-sustainable subnetworks may actually inhibit a stable network

Keywords: Networks; Relational Contracts; Collusion; Social Capital (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 L13 L29 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-08-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

Downloads: (external link)
http://repec.org/esNAWM04/up.27677.1049205899.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Networks of Relations (2010)
Working Paper: Networks of Relations (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:nawm04:496

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings from Econometric Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().