Internet Trading Mechanisms And Rational Expectations

Sergei Severinov and Michael Peters ()

No 551, Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings from Econometric Society

Abstract: This paper studies an internet trading mechanism similar to the one described in Peters and Severinov (2001) in a market where traders values are interdependent. It is shown that under reasonable conditions this mechanism has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium which supports allocations that converge to rational expectations equilibrium allocations. In particular, this equilibrium supports allocations that are ex post efficient. We show how to construct the rational expectations equilibrium from the market outcome. The mechanism is also compared to a double auction

Keywords: internet auctions; rational expectations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-08-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:nawm04:551

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